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John (Jeff) Scroggin, J.D., LL.M., AEP, Editor
Email: JJS@scrogginlaw.com
Phone: 770-640-1101
"Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body." Justice Cardozo
The debate over the withdrawal of life support has been a
long and costly legal and political conflict.1
The real fight begin in the early '60s, when medicine had
advanced to the stage that permanently unconscious clients could
be kept alive even with little brain activity. As a result,
debates began to occur about a patient's "right to die." The
aging of the baby boomers and their parents is increasing the
issues surrounding a client's medical decision making.
In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In Re
Quinlan.2 The court decided that
a heart/lung machine could be withdrawn from Karen Ann Quinlan,
but required that intravenous fluids and nourishment must
continue, even though Miss Quinlan had no brain activity.
Although doctors had expected her to die after being taken off
the heart/lung machine, she continued to breathe. She lived
almost 10 more years on intravenous fluids and nourishment. Also
in 1976, California became the first state to approve living
wills. By 1992 all 50 states had adopted similar legislation.
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health,3
the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged a constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. The Supreme
Court largely deferred to states to determine how this
constitutional right would be exercised, particularly when the
decision is made by surrogates or there was no written
declaration. Missouri applied a "clear and convincing" evidence
standard to determine whether such a refusal had been made by
Nancy Cruzan. Although this evidence standard would necessitate
a written medical directive in most cases, the Missouri courts
found that Nancy Cruzan had made sufficient verbal declarations
to permit withdrawal of nourishment. Eight years after the
accident which rendered her permanently unconscious and without
significant brain activity, Nancy Cruzan died.
In 1991 Congress passed The Patient Self-Determination Act,4
which requires health care providers (e.g., hospitals, nursing
homes, hospice programs, home health care agencies and HMOs)
receiving Medicaid and Medicare payments to ascertain the intent
of patients about advance directives for health care and provide
patients educational materials about their rights under state
law.
In 1994 an Oregon referendum resulted in the adoption of a
new statute, The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Oregon Statutes
section 127.800 et. seq., which permitted physician assisted
suicide in certain circumstances. The implementation of the act
was enjoined by the District Court in Lee. v. State of Oregon.5
The injunction was lifted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Lee v. Oregon, 107 F3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).The plaintiff's
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied.
In Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 79 F3d
790 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
overturned a Washington statute which made physician assisted
suicide a criminal act. The Ninth Circuit found a due process
constitutional right to physician assisted suicides. One month
later, in Quill v. Vacco 6,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a New York
statute which prohibited physician assisted suicide. The Second
Circuit ruled that the law violated the equal protection
provisions of the U.S. Constitution.
On June 26, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned both
Circuit Court decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg,7
and Vacco v. Quill.8 The U.S.
Supreme Court left it up to the states to determine whether to
prohibit physician assisted suicide. The Court could find no
constitutional right for terminally ill patients to obtain a
physician's assistance in ending their lives. The battle over
physician assisted suicides has continued around the country. In
39 states, it is a criminal act to assist in any suicide.
In April 1998, President Clinton signed into law The Assisted
Suicide Funding Restrictions Act of 1997, which prevents the
federal governments from reimbursing costs associated with
physician assisted suicide. The bill also provided for the
funding of programs to reduce the rate of suicide by persons
with disabilities or terminal or chronic illnesses.
As demonstrated by the Terri Schiavo debacle, the legal,
medical and moral controversies over euthanasia and the right to
die can be intense and conflict-laden. We as estate planning
advisors have a responsibility to make sure clients have at
least addressed how they want medical decisions to be made if
they become incapacitated.
Most people would prefer to decide who will make medical
decisions for them and, in some cases, restrict how the
decisions can be made. Failing to do so breeds both additional
costs and the potential for family turmoil. For example, a 1992
study in the Archives of Internal Medicine reported that having
a living will or medical power of attorney saved almost $65,000
per patient in the final stay in the hospital.9
The average cost from 1990 through 1992 of persons without
medical directives was $95,305 versus $30,478 for those who had
medical directives. Since 1992 medical care costs have increased
at a significant rate.
There are some traps for the unwary in this area, including:
- Failing to Plan for the Young. Much of the focus on
Advanced Medical Directives has been on the need for the
elderly to plan for this incapacity. However, it is
interesting that Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan and Terri
Schiavo were all young women in their late 20s and early 30s—people who you would not expect to need an advanced medical
directive. This failed assumption has proven true in my own
family. In August of 2006, my twenty-year old son sustained a
serious brain injury. Even though he was getting ready to go
to Iraq, I had never considered the need for a Living Will or
Medical Power of Attorney for him—now each of my three
children have signed advanced medical directives.
- Differences in Law. Pursuant to the Cruzan
decision, Supreme Court has largely left it up to the state to
determine how medical decision making will be made for
incapacitated individuals. Unfortunately, the rules vary
widely from state to state and clients moving from one state
to another, should make sure local counsel reviews their
existing documents when they change states of residence.
Moreover, as shown by the article on Europe's rules on Medical
Directives in this NAEPC Journal, the rules governing medical
decision making vary widely throughout the world.
- Only Having a Living Will. During the Terri Schiavo
case, the media talked a lot about the need for a living will.
The living will has two major flaws. First it only deals with
life sustaining treatment. It does not deal with who makes
other medical issues for a disabled client. Second, the final
decision makers with living will are the physicians. Most
clients would prefer to turn that decision process over to
trusted family members or friends. The reality is that the
Medical Power of Attorney or similar advanced directive is the
more important document.
- Marriage and Divorce. Some states provide that
unless the power of attorney expressly provides otherwise, a
subsequent marriage acts as an automatic revocation of the
designation of any person to serve as power holder other than
the principal's spouse.10 More problematic, is that many
divorced couples fail to remove their ex-spouse from their
medical power of attorney—do you really want that estranged
ex-spouse to decide what pain killers you are going to
receive?
It is also important for clients to leave information for
family members on the types of decisions they want to be made if
they become incapacitated. For example, "I want to be kept at
home as long as possible." Clients may want to consider
executing "ethical wills" in which they discuss their thoughts
on receiving life sustaining treatment and other philosophical
perspectives. Barry K. Baines, The Ethical Will: Reviving a
Biblical Tradition and Applying it to Retirement Planning,
Journal of Retirement Planning, June 1999. This article provides
practical advice in writing an ethical will. See also, Kathleen
M. Rehl, Help Your Clients Preserve Values, Tell Stories and
Share the "Voice of Their Hearts" Through Ethical Wills, J.
Prac.Est.Plan., July 2003; Josephine Turner, Estate Planning:
Ethical Wills, found at
http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/BODY_FY536;
Robert Flashman, Melissa Flashman, Libby Noble and Sam Quick,
Ethical Wills: Passing on Treasures of the Heart, found at
www.ces.ncsu.edu/depts/fcs/pub/1998/wills.html.
ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
Books On Medical Decision Making
- Living Wills Made E-Z: Includes Power of Attorney for
Healthcare (Made Ez Products, 2001)
- Kessler, David, The Needs of the Dying (Quill 2000)
- Kuhl, David, What Dying People Want (Public Affairs 2003)
- Lieberson, Alan D., Advance Medical Directives (West 2004)
- Meisel, Alan and Cerminara, Kathy L., The Right To Die (Aspen
Publishers 2003).
- William Molloy, Let Me Decide: The Health and Personal Care
Directive That Speaks for You When You Can't (Biblio
Distribution 2003)
Websites On Aging And Critical Care Issues
Internet Resources For The Elderly
Articles Discussing the Moral, Ethical and Religious Issues
of Medical Directives
Notes
| 1 |
See Peter G. Filene, In the Arms of Others:
A Cultural History of the Right to Die in America, Chicago:
Dee 1998; Alan Meisel and Kathy L. Cerminara, The Right to
Die, The Law of End-of-Life Decision Making, (Aspen 2003).
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| 2 |
355 A2d647 (N.J.), cert denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976). |
| 3 |
497 U.S. 289 (1990), |
| 4 |
Public Law 101-508; 42 U.S.C. §1395cc(a)
|
| 5 |
819 F. Supp 1429 (D Or 1995). |
| 6 |
80 F3d 716 (2nd Cir 1996), |
| 7 |
521 U.S. 702 (1997), |
| 8 |
521 U.S.793 (1997). |
| 9 |
See C.V. Chambers, J.J. Diamond, R.L.
Perkel and L.A. Lasch, Relationship of Advance Directives to
Hospital Charges in a Medicare Population, Archives of
Internal Medical, March 1994, Volume 154. See also, P.A.
Singer and F.H. Lowy, Rationing, Patient Preferences and
Cost of Care at the End of Life, Archives of Internal
Medical, March 1992. |
| 10 |
c.f. the Georgia statute: O.C.G.A. Section
31-36-6(b). |
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