We just sent you a
"LISI" FLASH on Supreme Court Cert in Rudkin by Carol Cantrell
and Pete Rubin dealing with a very important estate administration
issue.
So I thought this
follow-up by Jeff Pennell on another important estate
administration issue was timely:
Here's a quick
test:
Imagine an estate
worth $1.9 million on the date of the decedent's death, that grows to $2.2
million before termination.
The decedent's will
calls for a formula credit shelter pecuniary bequest of the largest amount
that will pass free of tax and leaves the residue of the estate to a
marital deduction trust.
At death the
applicable exclusion amount sheltered by the unified credit is $2.0
million dollars, which exceeds the federal estate tax value of this estate
by $100,000.
Here's the
question:
At the end of
estate administration, on distribution, to whom does the $2.2
million pass?
Emory University School of Law
Professor Jeff Pennell,
author of
WEALTH TRANSFER PLANNING AND DRAFTING (West 2005),
FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION (West 2004), the classic
ESTATE PLANNING provides LISI members with the Goldman court's first
impression answer to this abatement issue – and his views on that result.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY:
In re Estate of
Goldman is not a tax case. But it addressed that timing question as a
matter of abatement law of first impression in Arizona (a Uniform Probate
Code state) "and possibly the nation as a whole." When do we determine
whether (or the extent to which) the pre-residuary credit shelter bequest
abates?
According to
Goldman the proper time is when distribution is made, meaning in the
hypothetical above that the pre-residuary credit shelter bequest would
receive a full $2.0 million, because growth during administration
precluded abatement entirely, and the added $200,000 of growth would
remain as marital deduction residue.
In so holding the court rejected the estate's argument that delay in
administration should have no impact on the entitlement of estate
beneficiaries — a rule otherwise (such as the one the court adopted) puts
the personal representative in an untenable situation: Accelerate
distribution and the pecuniary bequest abates to $1.9 million, the legatee
takes the entire estate, and any subsequent appreciation therefore belongs
entirely to the pre-residuary legatee; delay distribution and the
pecuniary legatee can be made whole but any excess value goes to the
residuary beneficiaries.
MORE FROM JEFF
PENNELL TO FOLLOW. BUT FIRST, EDITOR ANDY DeMAIO ISSUES A LAWTHREADS
ALERT!
INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF CHARGING ORDER
Mark Merric and William Comer
just defined and commented on charging orders in LISI
Asset Protection Planning Newsletter # 107. Andy DeMaio
now provides us another dimension to the issue.
If a creditor obtains a charging order against
a debtor's interest in a partnership (or LLC taxed as a partnership), who
is taxed on that debtor's share of income from the entity? Practitioners
offer their views and cite literature, challenging some commonly held
notions about charging orders against FLPs and FLLCs.
To read this and other recent LawThreads
reports, log in at
http://www.leimbergservices.com. Once you've logged in, click the
blue LawThreads button under Recent Entries.
NOW BACK TO JEFF PENNELL WHO TELLS US THERE
MAY BE (FOOLS" GOLD(MAN) IN THEM THAR HILLS!
FACTS:
The decedent's
estate had a value of $1.9 million on the date of the decedent's death.
By the date of
termination, the estate had increased to $2.2 million.
The decedent's will
provided a formula credit shelter pecuniary bequest of the largest amount
that will pass free of tax.
Any residue was to
pass to a marital deduction trust.
At the decedent's
death, the applicable exclusion amount sheltered by the unified credit was
$2.0 million dollars ($100,000 greater than the federal estate tax value
of the estate).
On distribution at
the end of estate administration to whom does the $2.2 million pass?
COMMENT:
CLASSIC WISDOM – DEATH OF DEATH DETERMINES
ENTITLEMENTS:
Classic wisdom is
that estate entitlements are determined at the decedent's date of death,
meaning in this example that the pre-residuary general bequest would be
reduced by abatement to $1.9 million and, under classic estate
administration rules, delayed distribution of the pre-residuary general
bequest would entitle that legatee to interest, typically determined at a
statutory rate, usually after a statutory date (such as one year after the
date of death). Otherwise, growth during administration of the estate
would belong entirely to the residue. If statutory interest did not
consume the full $300,000 of growth in the hypothetical, the remainder
would constitute a residue that essentially did not exist at the date of
death.
The notion that a
residue can exist at the date of distribution albeit none existed at death
is disconcerting to some who understand classic abatement doctrine,
because the priority of abatement holds that a residue abates before
general bequests abate. Under that priority, at the date of death in this
example, there was no residue to receive the growth that occurred during
administration.
THEORY THAT
PRE-RESIDUARY GENERAL BEQUEST MORPHS INTO RESIDUE:
Indeed, some
observers want to argue that the pre-residuary general bequest in this
case would morph into or become the residue when it was determined at the
date of death that the pre-residuary general bequest exceeded the full
value of the estate at the date of death.
That also is not
correct, and the court did not hold that all the postmortem
appreciation belonged to the general legatee. (The primary significance of
alleging a metamorphosis is to avoid income tax gain or loss consequences
that normally would apply in funding pre-residuary entitlements, such as
the $2.0 million bequest in the hypothetical.)
STRANGE BUT
TRUE: WHAT WAS NOT REALLY IS:
The notion that a
residue that did not exist at death can exist at termination of an estate
is not really a curiosity. Using these hypothetical facts, imagine that
one estate is worth $2,000,001 at death, another only $1,999,999. There is
no reason to suggest that $200,000 of postmortem appreciation would belong
entirely to the residue in the first case and that there would be no
residue whatsoever in the second. In both cases it should be the case that
postmortem appreciation that exceeds interest payable on preresiduary
entitlements goes in the same direction.
WHERE DOES
ACCESSIONS LAW FIT INTO THE PICTURE?
One other reality
that suggests error in Goldman is the existence of accessions law
that informs entitlement to postmortem changes in an estate. The basic
rule is that growth — be it income, interest, dividends, stock-on-stock
splits, the birth of offspring to a herd, or whatever — belongs to the
beneficiary of a specific bequest as if that beneficiary became the owner
of the income producing or growing asset at death.
Similarly, interest
payments on delayed distribution of general bequests reflects the same
logic applied to the reality that a general bequest is not particularized
— there are no specific assets to which the beneficiary is entitled — so
it is not possible to track the actual income or growth (accessions) on
assets postmortem as belonging to the general legatee.
But the notion of
an entitlement to interest is that the legatee became entitled to the
bequest at death and interest is the closest we can come to allocating
postmortem earnings to that legatee.
MY BOTTOM LINE:
The flip side of
each form of entitlement at the moment of death is that, if the estate was
inadequate at death, the entitlement itself failed — the general bequest
abated — at the moment of death, and postmortem appreciation cannot
reverse that abatement result.
In this regard, the
Goldman court decision will inappropriately alter that basic
proposition - if it is not reversed on appeal.
HOPE THIS HELPS
YOU HELP OTHERS MAKE A POSITIVE DIFFERENCE!
Jeff Pennell
Edited by Steve
Leimberg
CITE AS:
Steve Leimberg's
Estate Planning Newsletter # 1142 (June 26 , 2007) at
http://www.leimbergservices.com
Copyright 2007
Leimberg Information Services, Inc. (LISI). Reproduction in Any Form or
Forwarding to Any Person Prohibited - Except With Specific Permission.
CITES:
In re Estate of
Goldman, 2007 Ariz. App. LEXIS 88.